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Abstract
Empirically very little is known about the impact of an increase in the
minimum wage of young workers on the job-skill composition. This is an
important question because small (or zero) eﬀects on teenage employment
may mask a substitution of more for less-skilled teenagers. Therefore, the
estimation of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers is required. This paper will consider the increase in the minimum
wage of young workers that took place in Portugal on the 1st January,
1987. This change is of particular interest, not only because it was so
large (33% in real terms) and aﬀected a significant share of workers un-
der 20 years old (about 20%), but also because it motivated a decrease
in the wage premium earned by young skilled workers from 1.24 to 1.20.
The results are consistent with the view that the minimum wage increase
had some negative impact on employment of unskilled workers, the most
aﬀected group: an increase of 1% in wage induced by the increase in mini-
mum wage reduces employment of this group of workers between 0.42% to
0.47%. Nevertheless, this negative impact was partially compensated by
the substitution of more for less-skilled teenagers, because there is some
evidence that the elasticity of substitution between young workers with
diﬀerent skills is diﬀerent from zero.
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1 Introduction
The debate on minimum wage (MW) focuses mainly on its impact on the level
of employment or on income distribution. This paper evaluates the impact of
an increase in the minimum wage of young workers on the number of jobs as
well as on the composition of jobs, in terms of skills.
The employment eﬀects of minimum wages remains one of the most con-
tentious policy questions in economics (see Brown, 1999). Much of the recent
empirical research has concluded that minimum-wage eﬀect on young employ-
ment is absent or positive (Card and Krueger, 1994), but there are also recent
studies that find significant negative eﬀects for young or low-wage workers in
the US (Neumark and Wascher, 2000).
Although there is some theoretical work about the impact of labour market
regulations on the composition of jobs, labour productivity and welfare (Ace-
moglu, 2001), empirically very little is known about the impact of an increase
in the minimum wage of young workers on the job-skill composition. This is
an important question because small (or zero) eﬀects on teenage employment
may mask a substitution of more for less-skilled teenagers. Therefore, the esti-
mation of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is
required1.
The main identification problem in the estimation of the elasticity of sub-
stitution of workers with diﬀerent skills is that the relative demand and supply
of skilled workers are set simultaneously. Some authors estimate this elasticity
considering exogenous variations of the relative supply of skills using, for exam-
ple, time and state dependent child labour and compulsory school attendance
laws as instruments (e.g. Ciccone and Peri, 2005). This work will consider the
increase in the minimum wage of young workers that took place in Portugal on
the 1st January, 1987. This change is of particular interest not only because
it was so large (33% in real terms) and aﬀected a significant share of workers
under 20 years of age (about 20%), but also because it motivated a decrease in
the wage premium earned by young skilled workers from 1.24 to 1.20.
The results are consistent with the view that the MW increase had some
negative impact on employment of unskilled workers, the most aﬀected group:
an increase of 1% in wage induced by the increase in MW reduces employment
of this group of workers between 0.42% to 0.47% Nevertheless, this negative
impact was partially compensated by the substitution of more for less-skilled
teenagers, because there is some evidence that the elasticity of substitution
between young workers with diﬀerent skills is diﬀerent from zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the back-
ground of the relevant literature and describes the minimum wage-fixing mech-
anisms framework in the Portuguese labour market. Section 3.3 describes the
data and summarizes wage and employment growth for both skills and age
groups. Section 3.4 presents the estimation method and discusses the results
1This elasticity, which is the slope of the relative demand curve for more skilled workers,
is also a very important parameter in several other subjects in economics.
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in terms of employment and composition eﬀects of the MW increase. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Minimum wage-fixing mechanisms and treatment of
young workers
In Portugal, the MW was introduced in 1974 to improve the pay conditions
of the poorer workers2. Initially the MW system covered only non-agricultural
and non-domestic workers over 19 years of age who worked in enterprises which
employed over 5 workers. Three years after the introduction of the mandatory
minimum wage, the government decided to create a special rate for young work-
ers, up to 20 years old, equivalent to 50% of the adult rate. One year later, in
1978, the youth rate was split into two sub-rates: 50% for young workers aged
under 18, and 75% for those aged between 18-19.
The largest change concerning age coverages took place in January 1987, in
which young workers became entitled to the full minimum wage from the age
of 18. Also, the MW rate for workers aged 17 rose to 75% statutory minimum.
The Table 1 highlights the major changes that tookplace in 1987.
Table 1: Minimum wage rates applicable to workers, according to their age
Age Group
17 18-19 >=20
Before 1978 50% 50% 100%
1978 to 1986 50% 75% 100%*
After 1st jan. 87 75% 100%* 100%*
Note: * 80% if trainee. Source: Diário da República
The 1987 law induced an increase of 50% in the MW for workers aged 17
(as it was raised from 50% to 75%), and, for workers aged 18 or 19 years, an
increase of 33%, considering the national MW at the same level. In terms of
nominal changes, while the national MW increased 12%, the 18-19 year-olds
saw their MW increased by 49,3%, and the MW for 17 years-old rose by 68%3.
This new law had to do with legal rights and citizenship, since in the past,
the age at which an individual would be entitled to full rights and duties in
the legal system was 214. Therefore, these large and focused changes in the
MW legislation are likely to have been exogenous with respect to employment
conditions, and provide an ideal opportunity for studying the eﬀects of minimum
wage policy on the youth labour market. Pereira (2003) and Portugal and
2For a comprehensive survey on the evolution of the Portuguese minimum wage see Ghellab
(1998).
3 See Table 8 in Appendix B.
4The change to the law was announced in the daily papers on the last day of 1986, as noted
by Pereira (2003).
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Cardoso (2006) used the same change in the legal framework, arguing that it
oﬀers a "natural experiment" in which a very well-identified exogenous variation
has a clear advantage over the most common methodologies like time-series and
cross-section studies, where there is typically little variation and possibly MW
adjustments are based on employment expectations.
2.2 Related Minimum Wage Research
There is limited existing on the relationship between minimum wages and labour
market outcomes in Portugal.
Ribeiro (1993) carried out an empirical study to assess the disemployment
eﬀects of MW, and found an employment rate elasticity to monthly minimum
wage increase that ranges between -0.1 and -0.2. Pereira (2003) and Portugal
and Cardoso (2006) examine the impact of the reform reported above on youth
labour market outcomes using firm level data. Portugal and Cardoso (2006)
modeled gross worker flows, accessions and separations, and found that the
major eﬀect on teenagers of a rising MW is the reduction of separations from
the employer, which more than compensates for the reduction of accessions to
new and continuing firms5. In contrast, Pereira (2003) estimates negative and
statistically significant eﬀects of the increase in MW on the employment of 18-
19 year-olds, with an implied elasticity in the range of -0.2 to -0.4, as well as a
positive spillover eﬀect on the employment of 20-25 year-olds from this reform6.
Elsewhere, there are several works that examine the impact of minimum
wages on youth employment, with results that diﬀer considerably across studies
(see Neumark and Washer (2003) or Brown (1999) for a survey). As an exam-
ple, Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Philippon (2000) examine the impact of
MW on youth employment in both France and the US using household survey
data, and conclude that real MW wage changes are typically associated with
significant employment eﬀects in line with competitive labour market theory.
More recently, Hyslop and Stillman (2004) analyse the eﬀects of a large reform
in the MW aﬀecting youth workers in New Zealand since 2001. They did not
find robust evidence of adverse eﬀects on youth employment or hours worked,
but found a positive eﬀect on hours worked by 16-17 year olds.
Small (or zero) eﬀects on teenage employment may mask a substitution of
more for less-skilled teenagers. A binding minimum wage increases the wage of
non-skilled workers making them less profitable and, therefore, may increase the
number of jobs for skilled workers. In spite of the existence of some theoretical
work about the impact of labour market regulations on the composition of jobs,
labour productivity and welfare (see for example Teulings (2000) or Acemoglu
(2001)), surprisingly, there have been few studies that use the variation in MW
5This result is consistent with the Dube, Naidu and Reich (2005) study on San Francisco’s
citywide MW adoption, in which they found a job tenure increase among workers aﬀected by
the reform.
6The diﬀerences between these later studies may be due to firm-selection and weighting
issues.
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to estimate its eﬀect on job composition in youth labour markets. In fact,
there are many studies that try to look at the eﬀects of minimum wages on the
distribution of wages, e.g. Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2000), but do not
explicitly take into account skill composition of jobs. One exception is the recent
Dube, Naidu and Reich (2005) study on San Francisco’s citywide MW adoption,
which reports that full-service restaurants increased their use of tipped workers,
which is consistent with a change in either job quality or skill-intensity in that
sector after the MW reform7.
3 Data
The data used in the analysis in this paper comes from the “Quadros de Pes-
soal” (QP) data set, an extensive data source that covers nearly all of the wage
earners in the private sector each year. It is produced by the Statistics De-
partment of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity and all firms
with wage-earners are legally required to reply to this inquiry8. The data set,
which matches the firm, the establishment and each of the workers, includes the
worker’s gender, age, skill, occupation, schooling, tenure and earnings as well as
the firm’s location, industry employment level, sales volume and legal setting.
From the original data set, the observations were selected on the following
basis. First, we dropped part-time workers as well as workers that did not work
the normal period in the month of the survey (24% in 1989, 23% in 1988, 22%
in 1987 and 23% in 1986 and 1985). Then we retained only the workers with
no missing values in the variables used in our analysis, such as education level
or date of birth and only those working in non-agriculture or non-fishery firms,
and located in the continental Portugal. The final data set comprises 71%, 72%,
73%, 71% and 69% (in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively) of the full
observations data set9.
3.1 Minimum wages and youth employment
The Table 2 and other tables and figures in the Appendixes A and B describe the
relationship between the minimum wages in Portugal and youth employment.
Some facts can be easily stated. The first is that compliance with minimum
wage legislation was high. In fact, the share of workers aged 17 earning less than
75% of the national MW falls from 53.7% in 1986 to 35,4% in 1987. Similarly,
the share of young workers aged 18 or 19 earning less than the national MW
in 1987 was 15,6 percentage points lower than in 1986. We see these facts
clearly in figures in the Appendix A. Wage distributions in 1986 for young
7Welch and Cunningham (1978) also estimated the eﬀects of MW on youth employment,
but in terms of age composition.
8 See Thesis Appendix for more details.
9which means that we have considered 1344691, 1366463, 1412985, 1426847 and 1506500
workers in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively.
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workers usually show two spikes: one at the sub-minimum wage, and other at
the general compulsory MW. In 1987, a very sharp spike can be observed around
the national MW for the 18-19 age group and around 75% of the full MW for
workers aged 17.
Also, hourly labour earnings of the aﬀected groups increased about 5 per-
centage points more than the increase observed for other groups. Interestingly,
gross employment increased in all groups. It is important to note that the
possibility to register a worker as an apprentice was not extensively used by
employers. In fact, the share of apprentices remains roughly unchanged in the
age categories directly aﬀected by the change.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics - all workers (age 17-19)
1986 1987 1988
Age 17
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 96.74 116.43 129.85
% Var. HLE 18.82% 20.35% 11.53%
% Below 75 % MW 53.69% 35.36% 26.84%
% Apprenctices 79.29% 78.90% 77.30%
Total Observations 23,467 24,660 27,128
Age 18-19
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 122.21 145.25 159.80
% Var. HLE 18.30% 18.85% 10.02%
% Below Nat MW earners 54.01% 38.40% 35.23%
% Apprenctices 56.75% 56.81% 54.69%
Total Observations 59,229 62,461 67,424
Age 20-24
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 161.10 182.44 199.57
% Var. HLE 17.19% 13.25% 9.38%
% Apprenctices 53.44% 56.75% 58.47%
Total Observations 171,789 185,513 195,992
Age >24
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 277.16 317.92 345.35
% Var. HLE 18.05% 14.71% 8.63%
% Apprenctices 14.79% 18.90% 19.76%
Total Observations 1,078,174 1,102,501 1,093,342
Note: Hourly Labour Earnings in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE). Computations
based on “Quadros de Pessoal” (1986-1988).
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3.2 Skill composition and young employment
3.2.1 Skill definition:
Another goal of this paper is to assess the impact of an increase in the minimum
wage of young workers on the job-skill composition. Therefore, we need to
classify workers as skilled or non-skilled, according to some skill definition. In
the database used, firms classify their workers in “job levels” (from 1 to 8),
according to the tasks and skills required for the job. This classification was
defined by law (Decreto Lei 121/78 of 2nd July). Hence, we will classify a worker
as non-skilled if he performs totally determined simple tasks, which require only
practical knowledge and are easily acquired in a short time (level 1 and 2). All
other workers are classified as skilled. This classification is prefered to the
classical definition using educational status of the workers because we have a
young labour force with a very small average of years of schooling (around 5
years). Also, the classification procedure is the firm’s task, which implies that
skills that are not captured by a schooling measure (e.g. ability) can potentially
be observed by the employer.
3.2.2 Wage growth and employment growth by skill and age group
Table 3 summarizes wage and employment growth for both skills and age groups.
Some facts can be assessed. The wage growth was significantly higher for non-
skilled workers under 20 years of age. Conversely, the skilled group observed
wage increases higher than the unskilled group for older workers. Therefore, the
wage premium of the skilled workers decreased after 1986 only for the young
group, as we see in Figure 1.
Table 3: Wage and employment growth by skill and age group
Skilled Unskilled
86 to 87 87 to 88 86 to 87 87 to 88
Age 17
Hourly wage growth 15.55% 10.27% 21.06% 11.57%
% Var. total hours worked 9.29% 18.14% 5.25% 11.98%
Age 18-19
Hourly wage growth 16.49% 9.85% 19.97% 9.60%
% Var. total hours worked 5.67% 17.49% 6.24% 7.88%
Age 20-24
Hourly wage growth 13.87% 10.18% 12.89% 8.18%
% Var. total hours worked 6.28% 7.75% 12.53% 9.44%
Age >24
Hourly wage growth 15.22% 9.22% 11.89% 4.12%
% Var. total hours worked 2.66% 2.23% 5.23% 1.12%
Note: Computations based on Quadros de Pessoal (1986-1988).
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Concerning employment variation, measured in hours, employment growth
was smaller for non-skilled young workers (under 20 years of age), while the
proportion of skilled workers increased between 1986 and 1988 only for the
young group (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 1: Ratio Skilled/Unskilled: Hourly Wage (1986=100)
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4 Estimation Method
The estimation method of the impact of the MW change on young employ-
ment and skill composition considers this change as a “quasi-experiment” with
“treatment eﬀects” varying across diﬀerent groups of workers. In order to use
this approach, we need to define “treatment” and “control” groups, where the
“treated” groups are the ones directly aﬀected by the new legislation. The best
known use of this type of methodology in the MW literature is the work of
Card and Krueger (1994) on the impact of the 1992 New Jersey MW increase
on employment in fast food restaurants. Dolado, Kramarz, Machin, Manning,
Margolis and Teulings (1995) label this method as the "diﬀerential impact" ap-
proach, and it has been used in many other studies (see, for example, Card
(1992), Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995), for the US; Dolado et al. (1995) for
France and Spain; Stewart (2002) for the UK.)
The treatment and control groups can be defined in many diﬀerent ways.
This paper considers groups of workers defined according to their location, sector
age and skill type. Some of these groups were directly aﬀected by the MW
reform (the treated groups), namely the ones with young workers, but with
diﬀerent intensity according to the share of workers in 1986 that were earning
less than the 1987 statutory MW. In fact, we can expect that the impact of
the reform varies across geographical areas or sectors, and this can be used to
evaluate its eﬀect on employment, hours worked or skill composition. Thus, the
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analysis is conducted at “local labour market area” (LLMA) level, which are
data-cells constructed by aggregating workers by location i (18 districts), sector
j (6 sectors)10 , age/skill group s (6 groups)11 , and year t (5 years, 1985-1989).
Using this definition, the maximum number of cells is 3240.
There are some advantages to the use of data at LLMA level instead of firm
level as in Pereira (2003) or Portugal and Cardoso (2006). First, there is only a
very small percentage of cells with zero observations (just 2,7%), which means
that any special concerns with missing values are unnecessary, and therefore
the bias induced by firm turnover is reduced. In fact, the exclusion of firms’
entries and exits from analysis may be a source of possible biases because the
destruction and creation of firms may be endogenous: we can expect an increase
in the number of firm closures as well as a decrease in the number of firms
created after the MW reform. Finally, local labour markets have more interest
for policy analysis. In fact, the eﬀect of a change in the MW policy in a given
labour market requires more attention than the eﬀect on a particular firm.
4.1 Wage and employment eﬀects: estimation and results
4.1.1 Estimation strategy
In order to estimate the impact of the increase in MW on employment of young
workers, the following labour-demand equation is estimated by two-stage least
squares, exploiting the panel structure of the data:
ln eijst = α0 + α1 lnwijst + α2Xijst + αit + αjt + αst + ηijs + ε1ijst, (1)
where eijst is the employment variable in each cell, measured in terms of the
number of workers or hours12 worked and w is the cell’s average hourly wage.
Xijst is a vector of variables, including the fraction of women in the labour
force, the average education (measured in number of years) and the (log) of
the average firm’s per worker sales. αit, αjt and αst denote time dummies for
district, sector and age/skill group. All of these variables are included in order
to control for labour market demand and supply shocks that are eventually
correlated with the MW reform. ηijs is a cell fixed eﬀect and ε is the error
term.
The first stage equation is
lnwijst = β0 + β1MWI86,85 × Tts + ε2ijst, (2)
and uses a "minimum wage intensity" (MWI) variable as an instrument to
the (log of) the average hourly wage in each data-cell. This MWI variable
is defined as the share of workers aged 17-19, in 1986 or 198513, potentially
10The sectors considered were: manufacturing (including water and electricity), construc-
tion, retailing and hotels/restaurants, transportation, financial services (including banking
and insurance), and other services.
11We considered 3 age groups (17 to 19, 20 to 24 and more than 24 years old), and two skill
groups (skilled and non-skilled).
12Hours worked include normal hours plus extra hours.
13We also used the MWI measured in 1985, as a robustness check, in order to account for
the possibility of firms’ labour force adjustment prior to the reform.
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aﬀected by the MW legislation (earning less than the new statutory MW in
1987). Tts is a dummy variable that identifies the treated group with value one
if t ∈ {1987, 1988, 1989} ∧ s =teenage group, and value zero otherwise.
The use of panel data with more than two time-observations is more robust
than a typical cross-section analysis conducted with diﬀerences observed in two
diﬀerent time periods. The control groups are not only the cells with workers
aged over 19, but also the groups with young workers but observed in 1986 and
1985. Also, the α1 estimate of the labour demand elasticity averages the impact
of the reform over two years.
4.1.2 Results
Table 4 shows the fixed-eﬀects instrumental variables regression results, using
those groups with workers aged 17 to 19 as treated groups. The impact of the
reform is evaluated using as dependent variable the number of hours worked
in each group, as well as the employment level measured by the number of
workers. The estimated employment-wage elasticity range is between 0.332 and
0.415, but with very large standard errors, implying that we cannot reject the
hypothesis of no impact on employment rates.
Table 4: Eﬀect of minimum-wage changes on teenagers’ average wages, hours
worked and employment
Fixed-eﬀects IV regression
Treated group: workers aged 17-19 (t>1986). Dependent variable
Control groups: all others ln(Nr of hours) ln(Nr of workers)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First Stage
% of aﬀected teens (86) × T .355 .355
(.077) (.077)
% of aﬀected teens (85) × T .323 .323
(.086) (.086)
Second Stage
ln(hourly waget) -.372 -.415 -.332 -.409
robust s.d. (.260) (.286) ( .271) (.280)
N. of obs. (n× t) 3152 3153 3157 3153
N. of labour markets (n) 634 635 634 635
N o t e s : A l l t h e r e g r e s s io n s in c lu d e th e fo l l ow in g va r ia b le s : f r a c t io n o f w om en , av . e d u c a t io n ,
ln ( o u tp u t p e r c a p it a ) a n d d um m ie s f o r . s e c t o r×ye a r , d i s t r i c t×y e a r a n d a g e / sk i l l g ro u p×ye a r .
R o b u s t s t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n th e s i s .
* * * S ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% , * * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 5% , * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% .
S o u r c e : “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t
However, the group that were most likely to be aﬀected by the MW change
was the unskilled group of young workers. Using just the unskilled groups (see
Table 5), we find a significative and robust negative eﬀect of the MW increase on
the employment (measured in hours or bodies) of the low-skilled young workers.
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The labor demand elasticty range is between -0.420 and -0.465 and do not diﬀer
significantly when we use the percentage of aﬀected teens in 1986 or 1985. This
result, together with the previous one, provides some evidence that this negative
impact was stronger on the unskilled young workers than for the skilled, which
means that it was partially compensated for the substitution of more for less-
skilled teenagers. Next, this hypothesis will be testen directly.
Table 5: Eﬀect of minimum-wage changes on unskilled teenagers’ average wages,
hours worked and employment
Fixed-eﬀects IV (robust) regression
Treated group: unskilled workers aged 17-19 (t>1986). Dependent variable
Control groups: other unskilled workers ln(Nr of hours) ln(Nr of workers)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First Stage
% of aﬀected teens (86) × T .560 .560
(.092) (.093)
% of aﬀected teens (85) × T .442 .442
(.109) (.109)
Second Stage
ln(hourly waget) -.465*** -.420* -.463*** -.439**
robust s.d. (.141) (.223) (.138) (.215)
N. of obs. (n× t) 1598 1601 1598 1601
N. of labour markets (n) 321 322 321 322
N o t e s : A l l t h e r e g r e s s io n s in c lu d e th e fo l l ow in g va r ia b le s : f r a c t io n o f w om en , av . e d u c a t io n ,
ln ( o u tp u t p e r c a p it a ) a n d d um m ie s f o r . s e c t o r×ye a r , d i s t r i c t×y e a r a n d a g e / sk i l l g r o u p×ye a r .
R o b u s t s t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n th e s i s .
* * * S ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% , * * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 5% , * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% .
S o u r c e : “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t
12
4.2 Job-skill composition:
4.2.1 Framework and estimation strategy
Consider this simple model, where the local labour market production function
is defined as:
Yijst = F
·
Kijst, Aijst
³
L
σ−1
σ
ijst +BijstH
σ−1
σ
ijst
´ σ
σ−1
¸
, (3)
where Yijst is the output produced in the LLMA according to a constant returns
to scale, constant elasticity of substitution production function. L andH denote
eﬃciency units of young unskilled and skilled workers employed in production
respectively, and K is the composite factor that includes all other inputs. A,B
are Hicks-neutral and skill-biased shifts in technology respectively, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between more and less skilled workers.
The relative demand for young skilled workers is given by:
ln(Hijst/Lijst) = −σ ln(whijst/wlijst) + σ lnBijst. (4)
Using the Ciccone et al (2005) strategy, the term σ lnBijst has been written
as the sum of a set of control variables Xijst, time dummies for district, sector
and age group, and a cell’s fixed eﬀect (α2Xijst+α∗it +α∗jt+α∗st + η∗ijs), where
all the variables are defined as before. Therefore, the equation to estimate is:
ln(Hijst/Lijst) = α∗0−σ ln(whijst/wlijst)+α2Xijst+α∗it+α∗jt+α∗st+η∗ijs+ε∗1ijst.
(5)
If the skill premia whijst/wlijst is correlated with the error term due to shocks on
labour demand, σ cannot estimated consistently by OLS. Therefore, IV estima-
tion is used, where the instrument for ln(whijst/wlijst) is the share of unskilled
workers, in 1986 or 1985, aﬀected by the new legislation:
ln(whijst/wlijst) = β
∗
0 + β
∗
1MWI
86,85
l × Tts + ε∗2ijst. (6)
It is more likely to observe a decrease in the skill premia in cells with larger
share of unskilled workers (potentially) aﬀected by the MW reform. Therefore,
the identifying assumption is that the MW intensity measure only aﬀects relative
demand for more skilled young workers through changes in relative wages. This
is reasonable as a set of controls and cell’s fixed eﬀects are considered.
4.2.2 Results
Table 6 summarizes the fixed-eﬀects IV estimates of the elasticity of substi-
tution between skilled and unskilled workers, with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Again, employment was measured as the number of hours worked
and as the number of workers. The estimated elasticity of substitution range is
between -0.282 and -0.434, but only the last estimate is significantly diﬀerent
from zero.
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Table 6: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between young skilled and
unskilled workers
Fixed-eﬀects IV regression
Treated group: workers aged 17-19.(t>1986) Dependent variable
Control groups: all others ln(Hijst/Lijst)hours ln(Hijst/Lijst)workers
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First Stage
% of aﬀected teens (86) × T -.580*** -.580***
(.144) (.144)
% of aﬀected teens (85) × T -.546*** -.546***
(.161) (.161)
Second Stage
ln(whijst/wlijst) -.374 -.282 -.434* -.365
robust s.d. (.257) (.348) (.236) (.321)
N. of obs. (n× T ) 1571 1574 1571 1574
N. of labour markets (n) 319 320 319 320
N o t e s : A l l t h e r e g r e s s io n s in c lu d e th e fo l l ow in g va r ia b le s : f r a c t io n o f w om en , av . e d u c a t io n ,
ln ( o u tp u t p e r c a p it a ) a n d d um m ie s f o r . S e c t o r×Yea r , D i s t r i c t×Yea r a n d A g e g r o u p×Yea r .
R o b u s t s t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n th e s i s . * * * S ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% , * * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 5% , * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in i s t r y o f L a b o u r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t
Additional results are presented in Table 7. In this table the only the young
groups were used, which means that older workers were not considered as con-
trols. The results do not diﬀer significantly from the previous ones. There is only
one estimate of the elasticity of substitution that is diﬀerent from zero (0.456)
which is smaller in absolute value to the ones found in Ciccone et al (2005) in
the range between 1.2 and 2. However, these are aggregate long-run estimates,
while the ones presented in this paper can be classified as short/medium-run
estimates.
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Table 7: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between young skilled and
unskilled workers
Fixed-eﬀects IV regression
Treated group: workers aged 17-19.(t>1986) Dependent variable
Control groups: all others aged 17-19 ln(Hijst/Lijst)hours ln(Hijst/Lijst)workers
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First Stage
% of aﬀected teens (86) × T -.941*** -.941***
(.323) (.323)
% of aﬀected teens (85) × T -.704** -.704**
(.334) (.334)
Second Stage
ln(whijst/wlijst) -.385 -.239 -.456** -.338
robust s.d. (.257) (.409) (.227) (.378)
N. of obs. (n× T ) 494 497 494 497
N. of labour markets (n) 105 106 105 106
N o t e s : A l l t h e r e g r e s s io n s in c lu d e th e fo l l ow in g va r ia b le s : f r a c t io n o f w om en , av . e d u c a t io n ,
ln ( o u tp u t p e r c a p it a ) a n d d um m ie s f o r . S e c t o r×Yea r , D i s t r i c t×Yea r a n d A g e g r o u p×Yea r .
R o b u s t s t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n th e s i s . * * * S ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% , * * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 5% , * s ig n i f . l e v e l < 1% .
S o u r c e : P o r t u g u e s e M in i s t r y o f L a b o u r a n d S o l id a r i ty, “Q u a d ro s d e P e s s o a l” D a t a s e t
5 Conclusion
This work evaluates the impact of the huge change in the MW of young workers
that took place in Portugal on the 1st January, 1987 on the number of jobs as
well as on the composition of jobs, in terms of skills. Much of the empirical
research is on the employment eﬀects of minimum wages but empirically very
little is known about the impact of an increase in the minimum wage of young
workers on the job-skill composition. This is an important question because
small (or zero) eﬀects on teenage employment may mask a substitution of more
for less-skilled teenagers. Also, the estimation of the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled is important for several areas of economics.
The results ound are consistent with the view that the MW increase had some
negative impact on employment of unskilled workers, the most aﬀected group:
an increase of 1% in wage induced by the increase in MW reduces employment
of this group of workers between 0.42% and 0.47% Nevertheless, this negative
impact was partially compensated for the substitution of more for less-skilled
teenagers, since there is some, but not robust, evidence that the elasticity of
substitution between young workers with diﬀerent skills is diﬀerent from zero.
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6 Appendix A: Figures
General Notes:
A = 1986 sub-minimum wage for 17 years olds (11,250 PTE);
B =1986 sub-minimum wage for 18-19 years olds (16,875 PTE);
C =1987 sub-minimum wage for 17 years olds (18,900 PTE);
D =1986 national minimum wage (22,500 PTE);
E =1987 national minimum wage (25,200 PTE).
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Figure 3: Wage distribution, workers aged 17
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Figure 4: Wage distribution, workers aged 18-19
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Figure 5: Wage distribution, workers aged 20-24
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Figure 6: Wage distributions, workers aged >24
7 Appendix B: Tables
Table 8: Summary of minimum wage changes
Minimum wages
Age Group 1st Jan. 1986 1st Jan. 1987 Diﬀerence 1987-1986
17 11,250 18,900 7,650 (68%)
18-19 16,875 25,200 8,325 (49%)
>=20 22,500 25,200 2,700 (12%)
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE). Percentage increase in parenthesis.
Youth minimum wage for 17 years-olds was 50% of the adult rate in 1986 and 75% in 1987.
Youth minimum wage for 18-19 years-olds was 75% of the adult rate in 1986 and 100% in 1987.
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics - all workers (aged 17 to 19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 17
% Skilled 12.08% 11.83% 12.21% 12.81% 14.83%
% Male 62.59% 60.63% 58.79% 58.44% 58.16%
Education 4.96 5.05 5.18 5.26 5.34
Tenure 2.81 2.73 2.83 2.40 2.75
Working Hours 188.97 186.58 187.73 192.37 190.84
Base Wage 14,380.46 16,896.93 20,455.44 23,315.94 26,934.31
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 81.42 96.74 116.43 129.85 151.89
% Var. HLE 18.82% 20.35% 11.53% 16.97%
% Below Nat MW earners 85.71% 83.98% 79.66% 74.43% 68.29%
% Below 75 % MW 53.16% 53.69% 35.36% 26.84% 19.15%
% Apprentices 79.63% 79.29% 78.90% 77.30% 77.16%
Total Observations 24,429 23,467 24,660 27,128 30,430
Age 18-19
% Skilled 28.39% 27.64% 27.55% 29.38% 31.33%
% Male 62.09% 61.14% 59.89% 58.70% 57.88%
Education 5.15 5.26 5.38 5.51 5.66
Tenure 3.37 3.38 3.24 2.95 3.21
Working Hours 187.71 185.55 186.65 191.12 189.37
Base Wage 17,973.74 21,113.36 25,234.98 28,238.10 31,947.83
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 103.31 122.21 145.25 159.80 183.89
% Var. HLE 18.30% 18.85% 10.02% 15.07%
% Below Nat MW earners 55.68% 54.01% 38.40% 35.23% 31.02%
% Apprentices 55.87% 56.75% 56.81% 54.69% 52.54%
Total Observations 60,316 59,229 62,461 67,424 74,875
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics - all workers (aged >19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 20-24
% Skilled 61.96% 60.83% 59.41% 59.08% 61.02%
% Male 57.46% 56.64% 56.70% 55.73% 53.85%
Education 6.04 6.02 6.06 6.13 6.34
Tenure 4.41 4.37 4.27 3.97 4.12
Working Hours 184.66 182.71 183.98 188.83 186.82
Base Wage 22,619.09 26,541.64 30,312.78 33,800.45 38,456.45
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 137.46 161.10 182.44 199.57 231.16
% Var. HLE 17.19% 13.25% 9.38% 15.83%
% Below Nat MW earners 18.98% 16.28% 14.89% 12.28% 10.48%
% Apprentices 19.66% 20.93% 23.03% 23.92% 23.43%
Total Observations 169,663 171,789 185,513 195,992 217,444
Age >24
% Skilled 83.21% 83.74% 83.46% 83.59% 85.09%
% Male 70.61% 69.14% 69.01% 68.21% 67.39%
Education 5.75 5.81 5.87 5.92 6.11
Tenure 12.34 12.36 12.34 12.15 12.02
Working Hours 181.62 179.18 180.63 185.86 183.54
Base Wage 33,116.74 39,545.99 45,534.31 50,204.95 57,220.36
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 234.79 277.16 317.92 345.35 398.35
% Var. HLE 18.05% 14.71% 8.63% 15.35%
% Below Nat MW earners 5.27% 4.34% 3.93% 2.99% 2.49%
% Apprentices 2.15% 2.40% 3.13% 3.24% 1.91%
Total Observations 1,071,660 1,078,174 1,102,501 1,093,342 1,137,768
National MW 19,200 22,500 25,200 27,200 30,000
75% of National MW 14,400 16,875 18,900 20,400 22,500
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics - Skilled workers (aged 17 to 19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 17
% Male 46.68% 44.06% 46.61% 44.99% 46.68%
Education 5.00 5.10 5.26 5.27 5.35
Tenure 3.36 3.06 3.55 2.87 3.03
Working Hours 189.30 186.23 187.71 192.03 190.32
Base Wage 18070.29 21151.62 24918.95 27868.49 31524.68
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 102.19 121.75 140.68 155.13 178.45
% Var. HLE 19.13% 15.55% 10.27% 15.03%
% Below Nat MW earners 49.22% 48.81% 42.89% 37.80% 34.01%
% Below 75% MW 20.83% 23.16% 15.78% 11.57% 9.19%
Total Observations 2952 2776 3010 3476 4514
Age 18-19
% Male 49.13% 47.17% 48.27% 48.06% 48.79%
Education 5.16 5.35 5.46 5.62 5.76
Tenure 3.67 3.55 3.61 3.36 3.70
Working Hours 188.15 186.10 187.05 190.96 189.49
Base Wage 20,414.84 24,210.63 28,343.94 31,570.24 35,417.96
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 117.12 139.84 162.90 178.94 204.36
% Var. HLE 19.40% 16.49% 9.85% 14.20%
% Below Nat MW earners 27.49% 23.81% 16.80% 12.51% 10.57%
Total Observations 17,121 16,370 17,211 19,807 23,459
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics - Skilled workers (aged >19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 20-24
% Male 54.24% 52.98% 53.35% 53.53% 52.51%
Education 6.22 6.25 6.26 6.33 6.53
Tenure 4.76 4.66 4.64 4.39 4.53
Working Hours 184.23 182.25 183.66 188.36 186.52
Base Wage 23,872.65 28,124.55 32,300.26 36,159.76 41,136.47
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 145.54 171.37 195.14 215.01 248.84
% Var. HLE 17.75% 13.87% 10.18% 15.73%
% Below Nat MW earners 12.01% 9.78% 8.01% 5.54% 4.31%
Total Observations 105,119 104,507 110,220 115,792 132,695
Age >24
% Male 71.09% 69.82% 69.62% 69.16% 68.16%
Education 5.89 6.11 6.17 6.20 6.36
Tenure 12.78 12.81 12.86 12.76 12.55
Working Hours 181.58 178.82 180.13 185.40 183.19
Base Wage 33,746.45 41,079.98 47,424.00 52,464.66 59,444.45
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 239.99 289.33 333.37 364.09 416.62
% Var. HLE 20.56% 15.22% 9.22% 14.43%
% Below Nat MW earners 3.99% 3.17% 2.73% 1.92% 1.67%
Total Observations 891,773 902,861 920,119 913,888 968,096
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics - low-skilled workers (aged 17 to 19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 17
% Male 64.78% 62.86% 60.48% 60.41% 60.16%
Education 4.95 5.04 5.16 5.26 5.34
Tenure 2.73 2.69 2.73 2.33 2.70
Working Hours 188.93 186.63 187.73 192.43 190.93
Base Wage 13,873.30 16,326.10 19,834.88 22,646.88 26,134.77
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 78.56 93.39 113.06 126.14 147.26
% Var. HLE 18.87% 21.06% 11.57% 16.74%
% Below Nat MW earners 90.73% 88.70% 84.77% 79.81% 74.26%
% Below 75% MW 57.60% 57.78% 38.09% 29.09% 20.88%
Apprentices 90.57% 89.93% 89.87% 88.66% 90.60%
Total Observations 21,477 20,691 21,650 23,652 25,916
Age 18-19
% Male 67.23% 66.47% 64.31% 63.12% 62.03%
Education 514.92% 522.32% 534.77% 546.51% 561.43%
Tenure 3.25 3.31 3.09 2.78 2.99
Working Hours 187.54 185.33 186.49 191.18 189.32
Base Wage 17,006.17 19,930.35 24,052.48 26,852.05 30,364.55
Hourly Labour Earnings (HLE) 97.83 115.47 138.54 151.84 174.55
% Var. HLE 18.03% 19.97% 9.60% 14.96%
% Below Nat MW earners 66.85% 65.55% 46.62% 44.68% 40.35%
% Apprentices 78.01% 78.43% 78.41% 77.44% 76.51%
Total Observations 43,195 42,859 45,250 47,617 51,416
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics - low-skilled workers (aged >19)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 20-24
% Male 62.69% 62.34% 61.62% 58.91% 55.95%
Education 5.74 5.65 5.76 5.84 6.03
Tenure 3.84 3.92 3.73 3.37 3.48
Working Hours 185.36 183.43 184.45 189.51 187.30
Base Wage 20,577.51 24,082.95 27,403.35 30,394.11 34,260.21
Hourly Labour Earnings 124.31 145.15 163.86 177.27 203.49
% Below Nat MW earners 30.33% 26.38% 24.95% 22.00% 20.14%
% Apprentices 51.69% 53.44% 56.75% 58.47% 60.12%
Total Observations 64,544 67,282 75,293 80,200 84,749
Age >24
% Male 68.26% 65.66% 65.96% 63.41% 62.97%
Education 5.07 4.28 4.39 4.53 4.69
Tenure 10.14 10.02 9.71 9.07 8.96
Working Hours 181.78 181.04 183.13 188.20 185.51
Base Wage 29,995.00 31,645.96 36,000.82 38,697.10 44,530.42
Hourly Labour Earnings 209.02 214.51 240.02 249.91 294.14
% Below Nat MW earners 11.62% 10.37% 9.99% 8.43% 7.13%
% Apprentices 12.80% 14.79% 18.90% 19.76% 12.80%
Total Observations 179,887 175,313 182,382 179,454 169,672
Notes: Values in current Portuguese Escudos (PTE)..
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics - ratio Skilled/Low-Skilled
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Age 17
Working Hours 1.002 0.998 1.000 0.998 0.997
Base Wage 1.303 1.296 1.256 1.231 1.206
Hourly Labour Earnings 1.301 1.304 1.244 1.230 1.212
% Below Nat MW earners 0.543 0.550 0.506 0.474 0.458
% Below 75% MW 0.362 0.401 0.414 0.398 0.440
Total Observations 0.137 0.134 0.139 0.147 0.174
Age 18-19
Working Hours 1.003 1.004 1.003 0.999 1.001
Base Wage 1.200 1.215 1.178 1.176 1.166
Hourly Labour Earnings 1.197 1.211 1.176 1.179 1.171
% Below Nat MW earners 0.411 0.363 0.360 0.280 0.262
Total Observations 0.396 0.382 0.380 0.416 0.456
Age 20-24
Working Hours 0.994 0.994 0.996 0.994 0.996
Base Wage 1.160 1.168 1.179 1.190 1.201
Hourly Labour Earnings 1.171 1.181 1.191 1.213 1.223
% Below Nat MW earners 0.396 0.371 0.321 0.252 0.214
Total Observations 1.629 1.553 1.464 1.444 1.566
Age >24
Working Hours 0.999 0.988 0.984 0.985 0.988
Base Wage 1.125 1.298 1.317 1.356 1.335
Hourly Labour Earnings 1.148 1.349 1.389 1.457 1.416
% Below Nat MW earners 0.343 0.306 0.273 0.228 0.235
Total Observations 4.957 5.150 5.045 5.093 5.706
25
References
[1] Abowd, John, Francis Kramarz, David N. Margolis and Thomas Philippon
(2000), "The tail of two countries: minimum wages and employment in
France and the United States", IZA DP No. 203.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron (2001), "Good jobs, bad jobs", Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-21.
[3] Brown, Charles (1999), "Minimum wages, employment and the distribu-
tion of income", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. 3, Ch. 32, pp. 2101-2163.
[4] Card, D.(1992), "Using regional variation in wages to measure the eﬀects of
the federal minimum wage", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol.46,
pp.22—37.
[5] Card, D.and Krueger, A.B.(1994), "Minimum wages and employment: a
case study of the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania",
American Economic Review, Vol.84, pp.772—793.
[6] Card, D.and Krueger, A.B.(1995), Myth and Measurement:The New Eco-
nomics of the Minimum Wage, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[7] Ciccone, Antonio and Giovanni Peri (2005), "Long-run substitutability be-
tween more and less educated workers: evidence from US States 1950-
1990", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 87, No. 4, 652-663.
[8] Deere, D., Murphy, K. and Welch, F. (1995). "Employment and the 1990—
1991 minimum wage hike", American Economic Review, Vol.85, pp. 232—
237.
[9] Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Manning, A., Margolis, D. and Teul-
ings, C. (1995). "The economic impact of minimum wages in Europe",
Economic Policy, Vol.23, pp.317—372.
[10] Dube, Arindrajit, Suresh Naidu and Michael Reich (2005), "Can a citywide
minimum wage be an eﬀective policy tool? Evidence from San Francisco",
Institute of Industrial Relations Working Paper Series, no 111-05, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley.
[11] Ghellab, Youcef (1998), "Minimum wages and youth unemployment", Em-
ployment and Training Papers, no 26, International Labour Oﬃce.
[12] Hyslop, Dean and Steven Stillman (2004), "Youth minimum wage reform
and the labour market", IZA DP No. 1091.
[13] Neumark, D., M. Schweitzer, and W. Wascher (2000) “The eﬀects of mini-
mum wages throughout the distribution,” NBER Working Paper, no 7519.
26
[14] Neumark, D., M. Schweitzer, and W. Wascher (2003), "Minimum wages, la-
bor market institutions and youth employment: a cross-national analysis",
Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2003-23, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
[15] Pereira, Sonia (2003), “The impact of minimum wages on youth employ-
ment in Portugal”, European Economic Review, 47, 229-244.
[16] Portugal, Pedro and Ana Cardoso (2006), “Disentangling the minimum
wage puzzle: an analysis of worker accessions and separations”, Journal of
the European Economic Association, 4 (5) (forthcoming).
[17] Ribeiro, Maria E., 1993, “Le salaire minimum au Portugal: les incidences
sur l’emploi”, Actes du colloque international: Analyse économique des bas
salaires et des eﬀets du salaire minimum, 30 sept.- 1 oct. 1993, Arles,
France, pp. 876-896.
[18] Stewart, Mark (2002), "Estimating the impact of the minimum wage using
geographical wage variation", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
64, Supplement, pp. 583-605.
[19] Teulings, Coen (2000), "Aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and
the minimum wage paradox ", International Economic Review, Volume 41,
Number 2, May 2000, pp. 359-398(40).
[20] Welch, Finnis and James Cunningham (1978), "Eﬀects of minimum wages
on the level and age composition of youth employment", The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 60, no 1, pp. 140-145.
27
8 Appendix: The "Quadros de Pessoal" Data
Set
The empirical work presented in these three papers is based on the data set
“Quadros de Pessoal”, of the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).
Beginning in 1982, and on a yearly basis, this longitudinal data is a standardised
questionnaire that all firms with wage-earners are legally required to complete,
which guarantees a very high response rate. In addition, the fact that infor-
mation is directly provided by the employer, besides the legal obligation for
this information to be permanently displayed in a public space on the firm’s
premises, reduces measurement errors and contributes to their reliability. Fur-
thermore, the "Quadros de Pessoal" registry is routinely used by the inspectors
of the Ministry to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies with the law.
The data includes information on all companies operating in Portugal, ex-
cept family businesses without wage-earning employees. This data set covers,
roughly, one half of all the active population. The next Table reports the number
of records for the years under consideration.
Table 16: Number of records in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999
Year Workers Firms Establishments
1987 1 936 801 110.865 132.823
1989 2 169 835 137 155 161 094
1991 2 233 237 148 602 173 551
1993 2 215 481 184 306 193 804
1995 2 232 548 192 270 223 393
1997 2 350 782 213 589 248 664
1999 2 568 456 244 241 284 368
The access to this data set is conditional on the rules presented in the agree-
ment between the University of Minho and the Department of Statistics of the
MTSS, and is possible under request.
The data set is made up of three files:
(i) the workers’ file, with data from 1985 to 1989 and from 1991 onwards.
This includes the worker’s identification number (social security number), gen-
der, age, skill, occupation, schooling, tenure, date of the last promotion, profes-
sion, earnings and number of working hours. These information is relative to
the month of March (from 1985 to 1993) or October (from 1994 to now).
(ii) the firms’ file, with data since 1985. The main variables present in
this file are: the firm’s identification number, location (at county level), the
establishment and firm’s identification number, sector, legal setting, type of
agreement between firm and unions, equity capital, share of national owners in
the equity capital, share of foreign owners in the equity capital, share of public
owner in the equity capital, yearly sales, number of establishments (since 1994),
employment level (observed in March, between 1985 and 1993, and observed in
the last week of October, since 1994) and date of the constitution (since 1995).
28
(iii) the establishments’ file, with the firm’s identification number and that
of the one of the establishment (generated inside each firm), location, sector and
number of employees.
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